JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION AS CIVILIAN POWERS

Prospects for security cooperation in Southeast Asia

Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

Bachelor paper
submitted by
Thomas Jansen

2008-2009
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2008-2009
To my grandparents

Sylvain Jansen
Herman Vandewalle
Simonne Vandaele
Liliane Van Damme
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List of abbreviations

AMM  Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM  Asia-Europe Meeting
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER  Comité des Représentants Permanents
DG E  Directorate General E – External Economic Relations – Politico-Military Affairs
DG RELEX  Directorate General for External Relations
DPJ  Democratic Party of Japan
EC  European Community
ECSC  Economic Coal and Steel Community
EDA  European Defence Agency
EEC  European Economic Community
EPC  European Political Cooperation
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EU  European Union
EUMS  European Union Military Staff
EUSP  European Union Special Representative
GAM  Free Aceh Movement
ICBM  Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
INTERFET  International Force for East Timor
JDA  Japanese Defence Agency
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party
MAD  Mutual Assured Destruction
METI  Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MITI  Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOD  Ministry of Defence
MOF  Ministry of Finance
MOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
NAAB  North American Affairs Bureau
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC  National Security Council
PAS  Political-administrative System
PRC  People’s Republic of China
SCAP  Supreme Command of the Allied Powers
SDF  Self-Defence Force
SITCEN  Joint Situation Centre
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Nepal</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>VCR</td>
<td>Videocassette Recorder</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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Introduction

In 2001, Japan and the European Union concluded “an Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation” in Brussels, Belgium. Both parties ambitiously pledged to promote peace and security by making substantial contributions to solving global security issues. These issues are terrorism, environmental degradation, disarmament and non-proliferation, conflict prevention and peace-building as well as human rights, democracy and stability. Indeed, in the post-Cold War world of the early 21st century, these matters have become security issues affecting every individual on the planet, from the commuter taking the train in London to children going to school in Kobe. Such planet-encompassing matters created the need for decisive global fora, where these issues are constantly being discussed by major international actors. By applying the notion of ‘civilian power’, Japan and the EU have positioned themselves as capable and proactive members of the international community, aspiring to tackle these issues together during what was to become a “Decade of EU-Japan Cooperation”.

Almost eight years later, though, security relations between Japan and the EU are still regarded as the ‘weak link’, especially compared to their strong economic ties and their separate security commitments with the US. After many high-level meetings, expert conferences, and annual Japan-EU summits, Japan-EU reciprocity on security has not yet been able to evolve into a more pragmatic, proactive and persistent relationship.

This paper will therefore examine the various actors and their obstacles in the Japan-EU security relationship, because it is vital to find out why after almost a ‘Decade of Japan-EU Cooperation’, security relations are still regarded as the weak link, even though both Japan and the EU are such economic and diplomatic powerhouses. We will start our discussion with a historic overview of the long road to political cooperation since World War II. After all, it is in the past that the basis for contemporary relations has been created. Secondly, an outline is given on current actors and norms involved in both Japan and the EU vis-à-vis general security issues and the effect on dialogue. In the last chapter, then, Southeast Asia is used as a case-study to constructively identify prospects for security cooperation between Japan and the EU.

In so doing, the paper doesn’t aim to provide a concrete solution to the low-profile of Japan-EU security relations, but instead aims to prove that Japan and the EU have evolved into capable civilian powers and that their cooperation is indispensable to the fight against new emerging threats of the early 21st century.
Chapter I
The Road to Political Cooperation

Contacts between Japan and Europe stretch over a period of 450 years. However, contemporary Japan-EU relations have their roots in the years after World War II and the following Cold War period. That is why this historical overview is confined to the Cold War period up until the 1991 Hague Declaration. We will see that political talks on security issues would be subject to a long process which was greatly influenced by Cold War developments. Therefore, this historic overview is divided into the early post-war years, when both Western Europe and Japan were drawn into the ambit of the United States; the ‘first’ Cold War Period, running until the 1970s when the US began to seek withdrawal from Vietnam, rapprochement with China and détente with the USSR; the ‘second’ Cold War, starting in the late 1970s following the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (Hook, 2005, p.32); and we will end with the Hague Declaration of 1991, when political cooperation between Japan and the EEC was finally institutionalized. To conclude, a concluding retrospective is offered, which will then take us to a more in-depth analysis of contemporary security relations and actors in the next chapters.

1.1 Early post-war years

The Second World War had left much of Western Europe and Japan devastated. Both regions now had the challenging task of rebuilding their economies to a pre-war level. Doing so, both experienced similar humanitarian, economic and ideological problems, however, they didn’t share the same solutions. Moreover, mutual apathy and internal preoccupations didn’t exactly make Japan and Western Europe ‘natural strategic partners’ during the early post-war years (Gilson, 2000, p.11; Berkofsky, 2008, p.1).

Its economy and society in ruins, Western Europe had its own demons to fight. Therefore, European leaders chose to hand over most of the running of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP - 連合国軍最高司令官総司令部 Rengōkokugun Saikōshireikan Sōshireibu) to American troops (Gilson, 2000, p.12). Europe was economically devastated, traumatised by the Holocaust, ideologically divided between capitalism and communism and suffering an identity crisis because of the loss of its colonial superpower status. The need to
redefine the role of the state, a new European identity, along with the need to pool economic resources soon led to ideas of integration in Western Europe. The eventual establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC)\(^1\) should be seen in this context. However, the run-up to this establishment saw a number of separate organisations and institutions coming into existence. With the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the Shuman Plan, the Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up and together with further integration, it led to the signing of the Treaties of Rome creating the supranational EEC and Euratom on 25 March 1957 (Rietbergen, 1998, p.429-430).

The role of the US should not be underestimated. Washington feared a dire economic and humanitarian situation in Western European countries might enhance the further spread of communism, which in turn would pose a security threat to its own ideology of a free world. Moreover, the Americans hoped to reduce financial commitments towards the rebuilding of Western Europe (Gilson, 2000, p.11-12). With the Marshall plan, the US set up an ambitious economic assistance package, also aimed at norms and values that would govern Western Europe. The Marshall Plan had ‘European ownership’ at its core and was a great stimulus for European integration. After all, there was no guarantee on political stability and economic recovery if former archrivals didn’t cooperate (Keukeleire, 2008, p36-p.38).

Additionally, the US also nourished military integration in Western Europe, mainly because of an American impression that the European economy could contribute more to its own defence. Although initially the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) was designed for Western Europe to responsibly build up its defence\(^2\), the outbreak of the Korean War soon transformed the Treaty into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under US command. Nonetheless, NATO, ending Germany’s war status and promoting the development of the European Defence Community\(^3\) (which eventually failed) are mere examples of American support for a European structure fuelled by its own economy (Gilson, 2000, p.13). And thus at least in the beginning, economic development and security were two sides of the same coin.

The economic side had at its core ‘European ownership’, while the security side was a joint

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\(^1\) The six founding countries of the EEC were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (see Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957) European NAvigator http://www.ena.lu/?lang=2&doc=16304 Last accessed March 1, 2009)


\(^3\) The European Defence Community was to be a supranational European body headed by a European Minister of Defence who in turn would answer to the European Council. It would have created a European army, consisting of military units of the six ECSC member states. However, the French Assemblée feared a loss of sovereignty and the project was consequently cancelled (Keukeleire, 2008, p.41-43).
effort of NATO members and the US. This setup showed that Western Europe was willing to conduct ‘proactive’ external relations, but nonetheless greatly influenced by the United States.

In Japan, the outcome of US guidance was very different. During the Occupation, the US was even more closely associated with the immediate post-war system than it was in Western Europe. Through SCAP and its leader, General MacArthur, the US directly controlled all of Japan. Although the original intention was to demilitarise and democratise Japan, MacArthur soon had to change policy, since similar to NATO in Western Europe, the Korean War had changed US policy in this region. Societal reform became subordinate to securing an ally against communism in Asia, a policy known as the ‘reverse course’ (逆コース Gyaku Kōsu) (Jansen, 2000, p.690-701). The Cold War prism now affected US relations in Asia as well. Although parts of Japanese society preferred to maintain good relations with the US as with communist -but proximate- China simultaneously, it was futile to resist being drawn into the ambit of one of the superpowers (Gilson, 2000, p.14).

For the complete duration of the Cold War, Japan would conduct a ‘reactive’ foreign policy, completely reliant on the US (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005, p.4). Also known as the Yoshida Doctrine, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂) preferred to concentrate entirely on economic rehabilitation while profiting from the nuclear umbrella of the United States. This doctrine was embodied in the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 (日本国との平和 条約 Nihonkoku Tono Heiwaỹōyaku), which was not signed by communist states such as the USSR and China. The treaty restored Japanese sovereignty, but de facto still left Japanese foreign policy to be determined by Washington, making Japan part of the capitalist side in a bipolar world. Simultaneously with the Treaty of San Francisco, Yoshida also signed the first US-Japan Security Treaty (日米安保条約 Nichibei Anpoỹōyaku) Although there was a wide-supported movement in Japan for unarmed neutrality and non-alignment, Yoshida proceeded with signing a security treaty which would make Japan an integral part of US conventional and nuclear strategy in Asia (Hook, 2005, p.33).

Despite this huge dependence on the US vis-à-vis foreign relations, it should be noted that Yoshida also tactically used Article 9 in the Japanese pacifist constitution of 1947 (憲法 Kenpō), in order to resist mounting pressure by the US to rearm Japan in the wake of the Korean and Cold War. Ironically drafted by SCAP, Article 9 prohibited Japan from having an

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4 In office from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1954.
5 Except for Okinawa (沖縄), which remained under direct US control until 1972.
army with offensive capabilities. This low military posture enabled the Japanese to free energy for industrial development, a luxury divided Europe couldn’t afford (Pyle, 2007, p.241-242).

Although both Europe and Japan were reintroduced to world affairs thanks to a high commitment by the United States, the way both regions would conduct foreign relations during the Cold War would be thus very different. In Western Europe, Cold War strategies were being discussed through NATO, while the Japanese basically handed over their security policy to the US.

1.2 First Cold War Period

In the early post-war years, the Cold War manifested itself with crises such as the Soviet occupation of Japan's Northern Territories (1945), the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Korean War (1950-1953) and reaching a melting-point with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. With these crises, the bipolar world had consolidated itself with East Asia and Europe as important theatres (Hook, 2005, p. 101). As we have seen, this prompted Western Europe to align itself with the US through NATO, as did Japan trough the Treaty of San Francisco and the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951.

However, starting from the mid-1950s, the Cold War's bipolarity would weaken, creating interesting opportunities for Japanese and Western European diplomacies (Ibid.). This weakening or détente was the result of a number of historic events in both East Asia as in Europe, such as the Korean War Armistice and the death of Josef Stalin in 1953, the neutralization of Austria in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 (Hook, 2005, p.102) and the Sino-Soviet Split from about 1956 (Painter, 1999, p.56). But most notable was the Cuban Missile Crisis, which convinced Khrushchev and Kennedy that

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6 See chapter II for more on Article 9.
7 Also known as the ‘Kuril Islands dispute’ (北方領土問題 Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai), the Soviet-Union annexed four Japanese islands: Habomai (菲律賓), Etorofu (樺太), Kunashiri (国後) and Shikotan (色丹). This territorial dispute has remained unresolved to the present day (for more, see Hara, 2007, p.71-99).
8 Immediately after the Second World War, Austria was divided into US, UK, French and Soviet zones. The occupation by foreign forces came to an end with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May 1955, forever making Austria a neutral country (Binter, 1989, p.415).
9 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964.
10 The Sino-Soviet Split was caused by several tensions between the USSR and the PRC, mainly coming down a divergence in communist ideology. For instance, Mao didn’t approve of Khrushchev’s secret denunciation of Stalin (Painter, 1999, p.39, 62).
11 US President from 1961 to 1963.
nuclear war would mean Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) (Ibid.). The aftermath would be a détente, or a reduction in tension between the two superpowers. This détente allowed Japan to re-negotiate the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. The new treaty now stipulated that both Japan and the US were obliged to defend each other in case of aggression, something the US wasn't required to do under the previous treaty of 1951 (Hook, 2005, p.124). In Western Europe, French president Charles de Gaulle withdrew from NATO's military structures in 1966 and expelled NATO troops all together (Painter, 1999, p.58).

Towards the end of the 1960s and well into the 1970s, the détente also allowed for more political contacts between the EEC and Japan. So far, both Japan and the EEC had mainly focused on each others trade potential by concluding bilateral trade agreements between each of the EEC member states and Japan. But in the 1970s, thanks to domestic and international developments, we would finally see some institutionalization of political ties between Japan and the EEC as an entity.

The developing role of the EEC, aided by economic conditions, was a major factor for increased reciprocity between Japan and the EEC (Gilson, 2000, p. 22-27). The Luxembourg Report of 1970 had created European Political Cooperation (EPC), shaping foreign policy through a tandem of foreign ministries of member states. Albeit not a common, but rather a coordinating European foreign policy, nonetheless, the EEC had established itself as an actor on the stage of world affairs through an enhanced European Commission, now able to initiate talks with third actors on various issues\(^\text{12}\) (Keukeleire, 2008, p.44-47).

On the other side of the globe, another Cold War milestone was to play a second major part in the establishment of political reciprocity between Japan and the EEC. The Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine, displayed by Nixon’s 1972 surprise visit to China\(^\text{13}\) and the US withdrawal from Vietnam, brought a genuine concern into the minds of Japanese policy-makers that the US might be backing out of its security commitments to Japan (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2007, p. 158-160)\(^\text{14}\). However, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (田中角栄)\(^\text{15}\) and Japanese bureaucracy also understood that the Nixon Doctrine was more of a sign that the bipolar world was gradually becoming a multipolar one (Hook, 2005, p.166, 185). Tanaka followed Washington's lead on rapprochement with China by 'normalizing' diplomatic relations with Beijing and by abandoning official ties with Taiwan, but he also devised a more independent

\(^{12}\) However, these were mainly economic issues.

\(^{13}\) Also known as the Second Nixon shock (ニクソン訪中宣言 Nikuson hôchûsengen)

\(^{14}\) US' passing over Japan in favour of China is also known as the notion of 'Japan passing' (Hook, 2005, p.7)

\(^{15}\) In office from 1972 to 1974.
foreign policy with regards to Southeast Asia\textsuperscript{16}, the Middle East and even Western Europe (Ibid., p.96).

In this independent foreign policy, Tokyo came to regard the enhanced European Commission as a potential alternative for a negotiating partner in the world arena (Gilson, 2000, p.25). In May 1972, Japan and the EEC started with a series of six-monthly high-level consultations, breaking the monopoly of trade issues by now also discussing political matters like the East-West issue, enlargement of the EEC, as well as financial and energy security\textsuperscript{17} (Ibid., p.26; Iwanaga, 2000, p.219). Consequently, there were increased Commission representations to Japan and vice-versa, meetings between delegates of both parliaments and biannual high-level consultations, allowing the nature of cooperation to be constantly discussed. These contacts show that the Japanese identified the EEC as a negotiating body in its own right, although they still had their reservations over the future of the EEC as a single unit, especially vis-à-vis non-trade matters and thus relations with the EEC were secondary to relations with China. It was upon these early foundations though, granted by a détente in Cold War tensions, that Japan and the EEC entered the Second Cold War Period (Gilson, 2000, p.26-28).

\subsection*{1.3 The Second Cold War Period}

Although Tanaka followed US rapprochement with China, his successor Fukuda Takeo (福田赳夫)\textsuperscript{18} would again pursue an equidistant policy towards China and the USSR. The underlying causes were two: a wary Taiwan faction within the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the stalemate US-Chinese relations had come into under US president Ford\textsuperscript{19} (Hook, 2005, p.107; Wang, 2001, p.200). Moreover, with the end of the Seventies, Cold War tensions would rise to such a level that the world would again find itself in a strengthened bipolarity, prompting Fukuda and his successors to tighten Japan's relations with the Western camp (Hook, 2005, p.107)\textsuperscript{20}. This second Cold War was evident in several crises during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there was the Iranian

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] Similar to relations with the PRC, Japan also normalized diplomatic ties with North Vietnam in 1973 (Hook, 2005, p.185)
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] With its huge gas reserves in the North Sea, Western Europe was of importance to Tanaka’s ‘resource diplomacy’ aimed at safeguarding Japan’s energy security during and after the Oil Shock of 1973 (Iwanaga, p219).
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] In office from 1976 to 1978.
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] In office from 1974 to 1977.
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] However, it is important to note that Fukuda continued an independent policy in countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), also known as the Fukuda Doctrine (for more, see Hook, 2005, p.186-188; Sueo, 2005, p.13-14)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Hostage Crisis of 1979-1980 and a US boycott of the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow (Ibid.). Additionally, Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and Nakasone Yasuhiro (中曽根康弘 1982-1987) would come to power in respectively the US, the United Kingdom and Japan. These three world leaders were very outspoken against communism and would govern during most of the second Cold War (Ibid., p.108).

As a nationalist, Nakasone was intent on making Japan an important global security actor, on par with its economic status as a G7 leader. To this end, domestic constraints (Japan’s pacifist Constitution) and international constraints (a reactive foreign policy based on the US) had to be overcome (Hook, 2005, p.108).

The EEC provided an ideal opportunity for Nakasone to forge a strong Western front against communism, with Japan as one of the proactive actors. With the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s, early 1980s, the Community showcased its sense of international responsibility in a unified way. It proposed a conference on Afghanistan in 1980, displaying a new role for the EEC in world affairs (Gilson, 2000, p.30-32). Asian and European security proved to be a common concern for the EEC and Japan (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005, p.7) as well, with the EEC ‘significantly strengthening relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’ (Gilson, 2005, p.32) and Japan expressing sincere interest in the Polish civil unrest of the early 1980s21 (Diplomatic Bluebook 1985, 95, through Iwanaga, 2000, p.220). This rendered Japan to review its reservations on a unified Europe22. The EEC now signalled to be a perfect counterbalance by breaching the monopoly of the US in the field of ‘Western solidarity’ and consequently, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro declared relations with the EEC to be an important pillar of Japanese foreign policy (Iwanaga, 2000, p.222). With renewed mutual interest in place, Japan and Europe discovered multiple facets in their relationship (North-South problem, climate, energy), which offered more intense contacts compared to the stalemate trade talks had been in23. Political dialogue in the face of economic friction had thus become the modus operandi of Japan-EEC relations in the 1980s. It nonetheless allowed Japan and the EEC to play a more proactive role in world

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21 The civil unrest in the People’s Republic of Poland originated in the Gdańsk shipyards, which eventually resulted in country-wide strikes against the widespread corruption and mismanagement in the Polish government (Painter, 1999, p.107).

22 The Japanese had long applied a ‘divide and rule’ approach towards the EEC, since it mainly saw the EEC as a potential ‘fortress Europe’ regarding economics issues (Keck). But with the EEC showing responsibility in political issues as well, the Japanese grew convinced of the EEC as an entity and international actor (Gilson, 2000, p.30-32).

23 The Poitiers Incident was highly illustrative of this stalemate. Despite a call by the EEC for more unity in dealing with Japan, the French single-handedly required that all Japanese VCR’s be channelled through the isolated small French town of Poitiers, where centuries before invading Islamic armies were stopped. The symbolism was received in Tokyo, with worsening trade relations as a result (Keck; Gilson, 2000, p.29).
affairs through cooperation. Although it should be noted, this so called political dialogue never was truly groundbreaking (Gilson, 2000, p.28-38).

1.4 The end of the Cold War

New opportunities arose with the end of the Cold War and highlighted the importance of the European continent and East Asia. In Europe, former Soviet satellite states expressed interest in integrating with Western Europe and its regional structures of the EEC. In Asia, Japan was now also able to play a leading role for regional development. The evident rise of the Asia-Pacific and European regions in a post-Cold War world prompted the EEC and Japan to coordinate more closely with each other, since each had a thorough understanding of their own respective region. In short, with a common interest in China and Russia, political interdependency between Japan and the EEC was deepening with reciprocity on a wide scope of issues as a result. Talks took place on the topic of civil wars, nuclear and conventional arms races, environmental degradation and human development. Regarding such security issues, both had a common interest in keeping the US outward looking. After all, with the communist threat removed, the US was now the sole superpower and still the main guarantor of security in Europe and Japan (Gilson, 2000, 95-98, 107-108, 111-112).

These mutual interests were acknowledged in the Hague Declaration of July 1991, signed by European Commission President Delors, European Council President Lubbers and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (海部俊樹)24. In the declaration, Japan and the EEC recognized and pledged a ‘common attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights’ (Ibid., p.94, Hague Declaration 1991). Admittedly, these pledges were not new, but nonetheless, the significance of the Hague Declaration lies in the fact that Japan and the EEC now formally recognized each other as legitimate partners and had created the foundation for deepened relations to come (Gilson, 2000, p. 89-95).

1.5 Conclusion

In the early post-war years we would see economic rehabilitation and security go hand in hand in Western Europe and Japan. In the early bipolar world, the US was the guarantor of security, while both Western Europe and Japan focused on economic rebuilding. However,

24 In office from 1989 to 1991.
Western Europe’s security issues were guided through NATO, whereas the Yoshida Doctrine left Japan’s security policy to be determined by the United States.

During these early post-war years and during the early intense years of the ‘first’ Cold War, the newly created EEC and Japan were anything but strategic partners in security. It was only during the détente of the Cold War that Japan and the EEC carefully started to explore each other’s potential for political dialogue. This move was aided by two major factors, first, the developing role of the EEC and the European Commission as an international actor, and second, the Nixon Doctrine displayed by Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China and the withdrawal of US forces out of Vietnam.

In the ‘second’ Cold War period, Japan and the EEC would continue working on more political reciprocity, especially concerning security issues. This was thanks to the EEC’s proactive policy vis-à-vis international crises such as the invasion of Afghanistan. This prompted Nakasone to regard the EEC as an interesting partner in his quest for a strong, proactive Japan in international security affairs.

Towards the end of the Cold War, Europe and the Asian-Pacific region afforded various political, economical and strategic opportunities. This culminated in the Hague Declaration of 1991, when Japan and the EEC agreed to cooperate on a wide scope of issues in order to fully explore these new opportunities. The declaration would institutionalize Japan-EEC relations and would thus provide the basis for further deepened reciprocity, such as the Japan-EU Action Plan of 2001.
The most prominent agreement by Japan and the EU after the Hague Declaration, was the 2001 Action Plan. Declaring a ‘Decade of Japan-Europe Cooperation’, Japan and the EU devoted themselves to cooperate in broader areas than trade. Illustrative of such broadened cooperation, is the first objective of the Action Plan which calls for the ‘promotion of peace and security’ through cooperation around three central themes: strengthening the UN, the elimination of all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the protection of human rights (2001 Joint Action Plan).

The Joint Action Plan could be seen as the convergence of interests by two ‘civilian powers’. One of the great minds behind the term ‘civilian power’ is Hans Maull, who defines it as:

1. a form of cooperative leadership to civilize relations,
2. national interest for the welfare of its citizens,
3. attempts to civilize the international system through law and institutions,
4. a foreign policy based on national values,
5. a foreign policy culture,
6. and stringent conditions regarding the use of force (Maull, 1990, p. 91-106)

In short, a civilian power pursues human interests while strictly confining the use of military means. As a result, the notion of security has altered to broader issues like drugs trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation and post-Cold War arms control (Gilson, 2000, p.51), a view which is well represented in the Action Plan.

In this chapter we will investigate actors and norms which have created this civilian power in Japan and the EU. We will identify dominant policy-makers and how their interests shape security policy. First we will discuss Japanese foreign policy norms and actors in the security field such as Article 9, the Diet, the Prime Minister, powerful ministries and the undeniable influence of the strategic partnership with the US. Afterwards, we will continue with EU foreign policy. We start with an explanation of the three-pillar system which is a fundamental characteristic of EU policy-making. Of these three pillars, the second pillar or the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will be scrutinized to proceed with a description of all relevant actors, ranging from the European Council to the High Representative of CFSP. In addition, the role of the United States will also not be neglected. To conclude, we will see that
Japan and EU interest in ‘human security’ doesn’t result in a rift with the US, but rather a supplemental strategy.

2.1 Norms and actors in Japanese foreign security policy

2.1.1 Article Nine

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” (The Constitution of Japan)

The above clause in the Japanese constitution, known as Article 9 (日本国憲法第 9 条 Nihonkokukennō Daikyūkudari), has been playing a major part in Japanese foreign policy since the end of World War II. Devised by MacArthur’s SCAP, the Article ambitiously prohibits Japan from having an army per se. The war renouncing Article 9 was used by supporters of the Yoshida Doctrine to resist US pressure, while the US now ironically called for a bigger Japanese security commitment during the Cold War (Vogel, 2002, p.105). However, through various interpretations over the years, a modern Self-Defense Force (SDF) (自衛隊 Jieitai) was erected which serves as Japan’s de facto army. The main interpretation allowing SDF, was the assumption that it is a civilian police force. This assumption is still shared by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (自由民主党 Jiyūminshutō) and the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (民主党 Minshutō)26.

Moreover, a revision of the Constitution and its Article 9 gained momentum in the post-Cold War era. The main reasons for a revision were, first, a growing public concern about the

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25 Human Security is a relatively new concept, famously advocated by Mahbub ul Haq in the UN Human Development Report of 1994. According to the Report, “human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity.” This new type of security eyes threats to every individual’s daily life and therefore challenges the notion of traditional or national security, which emphasizes threats to the nation-state. Seven areas of human security are identified in the report: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UN Human Development Report 1994).

26 See respective websites of LDP (http://www.jimin.jp/index.html) and DPJ (http://www.dpj.or.jp/) (Last accessed May 22, 2009)
military build-up in China and North Korea and second, the need for Japan to take a more responsible role on the world stage (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.324).

With public concern growing, it was especially since the early 2000s onwards that the Japanese political world started to express genuine intentions to revise Article 9. However, how and to what purpose Article 9 should be revised still was a source of much debate leading to three ‘broad schools of thought’ (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.325) within the Japanese political spectrum.

First, there are the ‘alliance nationalists’, including former Prime Ministers Koizumi, Abe and Aso, who want the SDF to play an active support role for U.S. forces and their rear-area security and an increased participation in peacekeeping missions. The second group called the ‘internationalists’ contains lawmakers within the DPJ, the LDP and its coalition partner the Komei Party (公明党 Kōmeitō). This second group only accepts SDF activity beyond Japan’s neighbouring region, if there’s a clear UN mandate for it. Well known ‘internationalists’ are former opposition leaders Okada Katsuya (岡田克也) and Ozawa Ichirō (小沢一郎). The third and last group is identified as the ‘neo-realists’, of which current Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō (石原慎太郎) is the greatest supporter. He and a few other neo-realists believe that Japan’s security policy should be autonomous from the US by neutralising all restrictions of Article 9. Ishihara and other prominent officials even advocated the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.325-326).

These three schools of thought reflect different goals, but all acknowledge Article 9 needs to be revised in order for Japan to take a bigger international security role. So far there have only been several failed attempts at revising the Constitution, meaning Japan is still cleaving to the principle of non-engagement vis-à-vis collective self-defence and combat missions (Ibid., p.326). It was only through, again, clever and broad reinterpretations of Article 9, that Japan was able to contribute SDF to peacekeeping operations in Iraq and strengthen the partnership with the US through rear-area support such as the SDF refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean. It is to be expected these overseas missions will be a hugely debated topic for all three schools of thought in the run-up to the general elections, currently postponed due to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Japan Times, March 16, 2009).

Concluding, Article 9 is the best example of Japanese anti-militarist norms among public and political opinion. However, being a product from the Occupation Period, Article 9 has proven to be a constraint for more Japanese active representation in global security issues where it
could cooperate with actors such as the US and the EU. Therefore, various Japanese policy-makers have sought to revise foreign policy in order to make proactive cooperation possible.

2.1.2 Dominant domestic actors

When examining Japan’s policy makers in the field of security, we observe dominant actors only in the political-administrative system (PAS). Dominant actors are domestic actors who attain the strongest influence on Japanese foreign policy-making (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.60). These are the Diet, the Prime Minister and his cabinet and finally the various ministries involved with security and defence. Private actors such as business groups don’t exert a lot of influence, because they are subject to the policy set out by the various PAS actors (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.112), and consequently, they will not be discussed in this paper.

2.1.2.1 The Diet

On the political side of the PAS actors, the Diet (国会 Kokkai) is officially the most important law-making organ. The powers vested in the Diet allow it to appoint the Prime Minister, approve treaties such as the US-Japan Security Treaty and control legislation concerning defence budget and SDF dispatch. Especially the Lower House holds prominence over the Upper House, since the latter can only motion changes to legislative bills, which in turn can be ignored by the Lower House (Ibid., 2006, p.117-120).

Another characteristic of the Japanese Diet, is that it has long been dominated by the LDP, which views Europe ‘as a partner in its engagement within a US-led Western order (Hook, 2005, p.292). As we will see, this political stance makes the US an undeniable factor in Japan-EU reciprocity. Precisely this domination in parliament and the presence of policy tribes within the LDP (族 Zoku) have safeguarded LDP decision-making from interfering bureaucracy, who also quest for influence. The tribes consist of LDP politicians who maintain valuable contacts with various institutions relevant to their personal expertise. Here lies the true power of the tribes, namely their connections to bureaucratic institutions and social groups. This way they are able to use the central bureaucracy to execute LDP policy and legislation and gain financial and electoral support from social groups (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.118-119).
At least, this was the case up until the new electoral system of 1994, when the LDP was forced to form coalition governments in order to construct a majority in parliament. Since this came to encompass the end of the LDP’s dominance in decision-making, it also signalled the demise of many previous powerful tribes within the LDP. However, in contrast to the demise of many tribes, the previously rather weak ‘defence tribe’, was able to exert more influence on policy-making than before. This remarkable turnaround has been credited to an increasing sensibility among the Japanese population for security issues such as the North Korean threat and China’s military build-up (Ibid., 2006, p.119).

2.1.2.2 The prime-minister, his cabinet and LDP factionalism

Another not to be underestimated political actor is the Prime Minister, his Cabinet and LDP factionalism. Admittedly, in the past Japanese Prime Ministers didn’t experience a lot of manoeuvrability with respect to decision-making. This lack of initiative within the Prime Minister’s residence (首相官邸 Shushō Kantei) can also be observed in past Japan-EU relations, which were mainly dealt with by the Japanese bureaucracy (Hook, 2005, p.290). This was due to an understaffed Kantei administration, a large influential penetration by powerful ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and finally the dependence of the Prime Minister on many factions (派閥 Habatsu) within the LDP government party (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.112-113).

These factions are not to be confused with the LDP tribes, since the latter transcends factionalism in order to sustain a collective party policy (Ibid., p.118). Described as ‘parties within the party’ (Stockwin, 1999, p.33), LDP factions demanded a proportionate representation within the Cabinet, effectively denying the Prime Minister an ambitious policy which could harm the interests of various, sometimes opposing factions. The Prime Minister’s limitations were amplified by frequent Cabinet reshuffles, in order to cater all the ambitious politicians within the different factions (Stockwin, 1999, p.98; see also Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.114). But just like with LDP tribes, the new electoral system of 1994 put a stop to the large factional influence, but failed to completely eliminate it. Anno 2008, power still lays with the factions when it comes to approving a party president, who indirectly becomes Prime Minister thanks to LDP dominance. The difference with before, lies in the characteristic of current factionalism, which comes down to personal ambitions rather than ideological
divisions, since the latter is now displayed with regards to other upcoming political parties such as the DPJ (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.114).

But it didn’t take a new electoral system alone to strengthen the Prime Minister’s role. It was only with the appointment of Koizumi Jun’ichiro (小泉純一郎) and thanks to reforms that had started under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō (橋本龍太郎), that a Prime Minister was finally able to allocate more power to his office and cabinet. The revised Cabinet Laws of 1999 and 2001 were instrumental to this end. Under the leadership of a Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretariat (内閣官房 Naikaku Kanbō) was now authorised to contribute to a top-down security policy and demand information from the ministries. Next to legal reforms, Koizumi was also able to strengthen his position through his regular consultation of private study groups, such as business and academic experts, in order to maintain an insight into foreign and security policies. This way he was more autonomous from powerful bureaucrats in MOFA, MOF and METI (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.112-117). However, central to Koizumi’s foreign and security policy was the bilateral relationship with the US. Koizumi didn’t regard the EU as a priority in his foreign policy, although he did acknowledge ‘the importance of working closely’ with the EU in global and regional issues (Hook, 2005, p.291).

2.1.2.3 Ministerial bureaucracy

Having outlined how LDP tribes within the Diet and how Prime Ministers like Koizumi were able to disparage influence from the central bureaucracy, we proceed to the administrative side of PAS. It is mainly at the bureaucratic level, Japan conducts foreign policy towards the European Union (Ibid.). The main foreign security actors within the bureaucracy are four powerful ministries: the Ministry of Defence (防衛省 Bōei-shō)(MOD), Ministry of Finance (財務省 Zaimu-shō)(MOF), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (経済産業省 Keizai-Sangyō-shō)(METI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省 Gaimu-shō)(MOFA). We will briefly discuss each ministry and their influence on Japanese decision-making in the field of security.
2.1.2.3.a Ministry of Defence

MOD, previously known as the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA or 防衛庁 Bōei-chō), was upgraded to a full cabinet-level ministry in 2006 and is the largest organ of Japanese government with a personnel of approximately 270000 people. It is headed by a minister of defence who in turn is controlled by the Prime Minister through the Japanese National Security Council (安全保障会議 Anzen-Hoshō-Kaigi) (Japanese Ministry of Defense). In addition, there are many other civilian officials from other ministries working at MOD, who control the uniformed SDF personnel, effectively making it a civilian administration (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006, p.123-125). The ministry’s role is to control SDF and implement security policies set out by MOFA. In contrast to JDA, MOD now has more say in security decision-making as a cabinet-level ministry, for example it can make budget proposals which are then approved by the Cabinet and Diet. MOD has the responsibility to work out Japanese peacekeeping operations and to confer with other involved international troops (Japanese Ministry of Defence, also see Atanassova, 2007, p.20-21).

2.1.2.3.b Ministry of Finance

Because it holds the authority over Japanese government budget, MOF has a lot of influence over other ministries and their budget. In the case of security policy, it has to approve budget proposals by MOD, effectively limiting the power of this new ‘full fledged’ ministry and even has a say about the defence industry by steering the budget of METI. However, MOF’s sphere of influence doesn’t reach beyond the financial side of security-policy, since MOF is excluded from the planning of many security-related policies like the strategic alliance with the U.S. and the structure of Japanese defence forces (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005, p.125-126).

27 The National Security Council (NSC) consists of nine members, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Finance Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and the Director General of the Economic Planning Agency among others (Cabinet Secretariat). Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (安倍晋三) proposed to reduce this number to three (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister) to increase prime ministerial leadership, but Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo (福田康夫) had to give up this plan in 2007. (China Daily December 24, 2007, also see Atanassova-Cornelis, 2007, p.20-21).
2.1.2.3.c Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

To some extent, METI could be considered as the most influential ministry in dealing with the EU, since the relationship between EU and Japan has largely been limited to talks on trade (Hook, 2005, p.313). Its main mission is to conduct an industrial policy and promote international trade in order to safeguard the strength of world’s second biggest economy. Formerly known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (通商産業省 Tsūshō-sangyō-shō)(MITI), the ministry has traditionally been a powerful actor in Japanese governance. Contrary to US-focused MOFA, METI has diversified its economic relations with the world by increasing contacts with China, Southeast Asia and Europe. Security-wise, through its judicial control over the defence industry, METI is linked to economic-related security issues, like weapons procurement and related military technology transfers (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005, p.126-127).

2.1.2.3.d Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Like the name says, MOFA conducts foreign policy and delivers the main policy through its many sub-bureaux. Of these sub-bureaux, the North American Affairs Bureau (NAAB or 北米局 Hokubei-kyoku) and –to a lesser extent- the Bureau of Asian and Oceania Affairs (アジア大洋州局 Ashia-Taiyōshū-kyoku) carry a lot of weight within the ministry and has led to a general pro-US policy orientation (Ibid., p.122; Hook, 2005, p.291). Because MOFA is furthermore characterised by first, a division of labour among its many departments, and second, a very diverse political dialogue, relations with Europe are discussed with many other bureaux and even other ministries. Examples of other EU-related bureaux are the United Nations and International Peace Cooperation Divisions within the Foreign Policy Bureau (外交政策局 Gaikōseisaku-kyoku), the Science and Nuclear Energy Division within the Directorate-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, as well as the Global Issues Division in the Multilateral Cooperation Department. The involvement of these bureaux reflects Japanese security interests with the EU as mentioned in the 2001 Action Plan, but the Bureau of European Affairs (欧州局 Ōshū-kyoku) holds a rather low profile within the ministry because of this large disparity (Hook, 2005, p.291)\(^\text{28}\).

\(^{28}\) Also see MOFA’s website for an organization chart http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/index.html MOFA (Last accessed May 19, 2009)
2.1.3 The United States as an external actor

It doesn’t come as a big surprise that MOFA’s prime focus is bilateralism with the US. Ever since the San Francisco System took effect after World War II, Japan never truly has positioned itself away from the US side. The San Francisco system committed Japan to military, economic and diplomatic dependence on the US, while providing the US with Japanese military bases (Vogel, 2002, p.1). This doesn’t mean the Japanese political world and public opinion have always been in favour of this strategic partnership. During the Cold War-period there have been ample examples of a divided political world in Japan, especially when the Security Treaties were being revised and/or reaffirmed (Ibid., p.94-122). Although the relationship has known its ups and downs (mostly in the form of trade disputes), the San Francisco System has never really faded away and remains at the core of Japanese security policy (Ibid., p.9).

The strong security link between the US and Japan strengthened under Koizumi. During his tenure as Prime Minister, Japan has positioned itself closer to the US than ever before, stretching the San Francisco framework. When the attacks of 9/11 took place in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, Koizumi was one of the first world leaders to pledge full support to president Bush’s ‘War on Terror’. Japan donated US$ 10 million in assistance to the families of victims of 9/11, an equal amount to rescue operations in affected US areas and it also pledged $400 million in order to quell Afghan insurgency. But in contrast to the chequebook-diplomacy after the Gulf War, Koizumi also invoked military means to support the US. Koizumi backed the US by providing ‘rear area support’ in Afghanistan. This was done through replenishing missions by SDF in the Indian Ocean and included transport, medical services, fuel and other supplies and permission for U.S. military bases in Japan to be used during the operations. Furthermore, Koizumi also defended George W. Bush’s decision to military act with ‘a coalition of the willing’ in Iraq against president Saddam Hussein (Hook, 2005, p.110-114). In addition, in a rare display of Japanese political efficiency, the Diet passed bills which allowed the deployment of SDF far outside the 1000 mile radius of Japan and even instructed them to protect American bases in Japan during the ‘War on Terror’ (Vogel, 2002, p.264). Legislation makers even allowed the Japanese government to financially reward cooperating countries like Pakistan (Ibid.).

29 Because of Article 9, Japan was unable to commit troops during the Gulf War. In a highly criticized move, Japan instead wired $13 billion as financial support to the Allied operation (Hook, 2005, p.300).
Even though Japan and the US are exploring wider options within the existing framework of the San Francisco system, this doesn’t necessarily mean Japan will take up more responsibility with European partners vis-à-vis global security as well, let alone with regards to the strategic partnership with the US. Admittedly, Koizumi did strengthen US partnership with military support, but ‘chequebook-diplomacy’ remains the primary instrument to help partners, even though its implementation is gradually becoming more strategic (Hook, 2005, p.111). Also, there is the already mentioned obstacle in Japan’s anti-war constitution, Article 9. Being a modern industrialized country with a space program, nuclear installations and the second biggest economy of the world, Japan could easily become a major nuclear power with long-range Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) over night, if it were to decide so (Mendle, 1997, p.130-131). But although there are some Japanese politicians who support the US’ request for a strong and normal military (see the ‘three schools of thought’ in 2.1.1’), Article 9 definitely remains a hindrance to Japan becoming a deterring superpower, not to mention the objections of regional and perhaps public opinion. Similarly, even SDF involvement with peacekeeping missions has proven to be controversial as long as Article 9 hasn’t been subject to revision.

Because of norms like anti-militarism and internationalism - emphasis on supporting human development through international structures- Japan has focused more attention on broader security issues like human security, while nonetheless dealing with traditional security issues in Northeast Asia (such as the North Korean threat) exclusively through its strategic partnership with the US. This gradual participating approach to broader security issues led to the discovery of new international partners, particularly during the post-invasion reconstruction effort in Iraq by a multinational force. This force included Japan and some member states of the EU. These EU members included, but were not limited to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Baltic countries, Romania, the UK, the Netherlands and Poland (see website Multinational Force Iraq). In the southern Iraqi town of As-Samawah, the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group (自衛隊イラク派遣 Jieitai-Iraku-Haken) was involved with humanitarian and reconstruction activities, for instance water purification, medical services, re-establishment of public facilities and transportation of supplies (see website Kantei). Although these operations still took place in support of US forces and president George W. Bush’s foreign policy, and although the EU didn’t participate as an entity, nevertheless, an incentive for the EU and Japan to cooperate in areas different than trade revealed itself.
2.2 Norms and actors in European foreign security policy

2.2.1 The three pillars of the EU

In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty (formally known as the Treaty on European Union or TEU) established the European Union (EU), creating three pillars of decision-making: the European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Cooperation. The first pillar comprises the EU’s internal market, common agricultural and fisheries policy and trade and development policies (Keukeleire, 2008, p.1). Together with the Police and Judicial Cooperation pillar, it will remain out of the scope of this paper, since it is the aim of this paper to examine why the Japan-EU security link remains so weak. Therefore, we move on to the second pillar, which defines the EU’s foreign security conduct, called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its main objectives are stipulated in Article 11 of TEU:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders,
- to promote international cooperation,
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (EU #1).

However, these six objectives and even the label ‘CFSP’ should be critically viewed. For starters, the denominator ‘common’ isn’t on par with its usage in institutions of the first pillar, where the term common designates a policy where the EU has exclusive or quasi-exclusive authority and possesses the instruments to enforce its policy. The CFSP doesn’t provide the EU with an exclusive authority or enforcing instruments. It thus lacks competences, which are still mainly in the hands of member states and therefore using the term ‘common’ might seem somewhat misleading. Secondly, the denominator ‘policy’ might give an impression that it is the EU which draws a course of action for its member states, while in reality the member states are the true agenda setters. Thirdly, objectives one and two, set out in Article 11, might be somewhat misleading as well. EU member states don’t always have merging interests and
CFSP doesn’t strengthen EU security in all ways. These misleading terms in Article 11 are all too clear when we observe the military defence of the EU, which is still largely maintained by member states through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the consequent role of the US (explained later) (Keukeleire, 2008, p.149, 152). In April 2003, Belgium, France and Germany did try to establish an independent military headquarters for the EU, but the UK objected, leaving NATO the most prominent instrument for military operations by EU member states (Ibid., p.180-181). This serves as a perfect example of the internal divergence on so-called ‘common’ or merging interests.

The other three objectives are more consistent with the EU’s foreign policy all over the world (Ibid., p.152). The EU has indeed committed itself to international security through strengthening the UN and cooperating in peace-building and the promotion of human rights, a commitment clearly visible in the Japan-EU 2001 Action Plan (see 2001 Joint Action Plan).

2.2.2 The four dimensions of an emerging European Security and Defence Policy

Whereas the CFSP pillar was very declaratory in nature in the Nineties, it steadily institutionalised around the year 2000 with the creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the post of the High Representative, efficaciously allowing the EU to undertake more proactive foreign security policies in the 21st century (Keukeleire, 2008, p.173). The conflicts in the Balkans during the Nineties showed a declaratory CFSP wasn’t capable in dealing with emerging crises on the European continent. High profile European leaders like Blair and Chirac realized the CFSP was urgently due for revision. Through the Saint Malo Declaration of 1998, both Chirac and Blair compromised by stating that the Union was in need of tangible, autonomous military capabilities, whilst contributing to the modernisation of the Atlantic Alliance. This was a major step to a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was formally adopted as such by the European Council of June 1999 in Cologne (Ibid., p.175). Over the years the ESDP came to encompass four dimensions: military, civilian, industrial and political (Ibid., p.175).

The ESDP’s military configuration was agreed upon by the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Also known as the Helsinki Headline Goal, member states were required to provide forces to conduct Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis management), while retaining voluntary participation in such EU-led missions. However, over the years the international security context had changed from war in the Balkans in the Nineties to worldwide terrorism after 9/11, prompting the European Council to launch the
Headline Goal 2010 in 2004. It stipulated that EU military missions were now required to adequately respond to unconventional or non-traditional threats as well, by taking part in disarmament and counter-terrorism operations. Thus, the nature of EU missions was now broadened well beyond Petersberg Tasks (Ibid., p.175-178).

Similar to the military dimension, a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was adopted by the Brussels European Council in 2004, specifying six priority areas in the civilian dimension: police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, monitoring missions and support for EU special representatives (EU #2). To aid civilian missions in these areas on a political level, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) provides advice to important policy-making organs like COREPER (Comité des représentants permanents), which prepares European Council meetings (Keukeleire, 2008, p.184). The Civ-Mil Cell for its part, then plans and implements adopted civilian conflict management missions (Keukeleire, 2008, p.184).

The industrial dimension aims to coordinate fragmented European defence spending. Through the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU tries to overview the industrial side of security policy and create synergies between member states (Ibid., p.192-194, EU #3). This has led to a ‘military-industrial complex’, where barely visible industrial - non-state-actors increasingly accumulate lobbying power vis-à-vis ESDP (Keukeleire, 2008, p.196). This is in stark contrast with Japan, where industry doesn’t have as much influence on foreign security policy. However, since these industrial actors are hard to define for the moment, they will remain out of the scope of this paper.

The political dimension, finally, has three problematic issues. Firstly, there’s a lack of legitimacy, since although there’s a European Parliament, it mainly remains sidelined in security matters. This is in stark contrast to the Japanese situation where the Diet has the last say thanks to its constitutional legitimacy, a characteristic many parliaments all over the world share. As we will see, the true actor in the political dimension is the European Council.

This legitimacy issue is also linked to the second issue of political leadership. In swiftly emerging crises, a council may take too long to come to an ambitious conclusion and most importantly, it is not clear who will bear ultimate responsibility for the decisions made. Along with the third issue of a missing common foreign policy, we can conclude that ESDP is well developed, but lacks a legitimate, political leadership (Ibid., p.196-198). This makes civilian-military operations a tremendously hard political exercise in the EU. Therefore, it is imperative to have a look at the true dominant political actors which cast the die vis-à-vis such security operations.
2.2.3 Dominant domestic actors

When observing domestic actors, we identify two dominant actors who are able to steer CFSP and its underlying ESDP, the European Council and the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. One would maybe expect the European Commission and European Parliament to have a stake as well, but they only have a minor role. The European Commission can only exert policy within the first pillar, and thus is very much sidelined with regards to CFSP and definitely ESDP. At times it does play a minor role through the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and especially the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX) and European Council (Ibid., p.86-88). However, so far it has failed to shape an influential structural foreign policy (Ibid., p.199-228) which is able to replace CFSP. The European Parliament, on its part, is only granted a limited consultative role in correlation to CFSP (Ibid., p.94).

2.2.3.1 The European Council

The most important EU organ with regards to CFSP is the European Council. It congregates the Heads of State and Government of the 27 member states along with their foreign ministers, the President of the European Commission and a fellow Commissioner, and finally the High Representative for the CFSP (Ibid., p.68). At the time of writing, the Lisbon Treaty, which calls for a permanent ‘President of the European Council’ (Lisbon Treaty 2007), hasn’t been ratified by all member states yet, so the European Council is still presided over by a rotating six-month-presidency between the member states. Because of the Council’s dominance, CFSP’s policy-making regime can best be described as an ‘intergovernmental method’ (Keukeleire, 2008, p.67). EU member states cooperate and coordinate their national foreign policies within the EU framework (intergovernmental cooperation). On the other hand, they also transfer competences to the EU, but retain strict control through the Council (intergovernmental integration) (Ibid.).

It should be noted that the European Council is not described here as the ‘most decisive EU organ’, for its conclusions are rarely crystal clear. This is a result of the many national agendas which have to be maintained by the Heads of Government. Instead of conspicuous conclusions, they are deliberately kept declaratory in order to be able to justify them to domestic constituents. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the European Council comprises all Heads of Government, is the precise reason why it is the most dominant EU organ, even
though it is not a conventional decision-maker. It is better described as an ‘organe d’impulsion’ (Cloos et al., 1993, p.486 through Keukeleire, 2008, p.68). The European Council “confirms, welcomes or endorses” CFSP policy already set out by the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the High Representative of CFSP, the Presidency or to a very much lesser extent, the European Commission. Other actors, mainly within the office of the High Representative, are then asked by the Council to work out the adopted measures (Keukeleire, 2008, p.68-69).

### 2.2.3.2 The High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since the creation of the post with the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, there has been only one High Representative. As a former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana proved to be able to draw on an impressive network of contacts stretching from Brussels to Washington. But networking and diplomatic skills aside, he is very much dependant on the mandate he receives from the European Council in order to negotiate on behalf of the EU. To complicate things more, the measures he works out are also conditioned by the resources made available to him by the first pillar (e.g. economic instruments from the European Commission) or the member states (military instruments).

The Council’s Secretariat (formally General Secretariat) provides the main staff of the High Representative and is in charge of planning and executing foreign security policy. The Secretariat consists of the High Representative’s Cabinet, the Policy Unit (formally Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit), the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Directorate General E – External Economic Relations – Politico-Military Affairs (DG E) and finally the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). In addition, the High Representative can count on Special Representatives (EUSP) who are assigned conflict mediation in areas like the Balkans or the Middle East. Next to these EUSP, there are also Personal Representatives for Human Rights, Non-Proliferation of WMD’s and Parliamentary Affairs in the field of CFSP (Ibid., p.81-84).

### 2.2.4 The United States as an external actor

We have already observed that the United States is an important actor in Japanese security policy, even though Tokyo is steadily also choosing alternative ways in dealing with international security issues. Because Washington is the biggest structural actor in the current
international system (Ibid., p.310), it is no surprise that the US is a determinant to EU foreign policy as well.

As we have seen in chapter I, this has always been the case since World War II. The US Marshall Plan was instrumental to the European integration project and without Washington’s foreign policy we might not even talk about CFSP, ESDP, or even the EU (Ibid., p.311). This special relationship between the US and the European integration project, has known its ups and downs. In 1995, there was a first important contact between the US and the EU in a post-Cold War world without a Soviet threat. The EU and the US agreed upon the “New Transatlantic Agenda” calling for joint action in, among others, a broadened security field by promoting global peace, stability, democracy, development and by responding to global challenges (Ibid.).

NATO is the best example of such security cooperation between the two structural powers. Although a construct of the Cold War, NATO is still very much active to the present day (Balkans, Afghanistan). However, neorealist theory expects it might suffer an identity crisis with the communist threat in Europe now removed (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2005, p.103).

Furthermore, NATO has always remained Washington’s preferred way for the EU to develop a common defence framework. When the ESDP was launched, a suspicious White House succeeded in interlinking EU institutions with NATO through the Berlin Plus arrangements of December 2002. The US realized Brussels didn’t have enough pragmatic means for an autonomous European defence and offered the EU a choice to either use expensive autonomous resources or NATO resources, which were well developed. This meant a pragmatic solution to the EU and a symbolic solution to the US, which now had gained a foothold in the EU’s ‘autonomous’ ESDP (Keukeleire, 2008, p.176).

This move could be seen as a tactic to discourage any possible strategic independence of the EU (Ibid., p.176). However, the US doesn’t regard the EU as a strong security actor as of yet (Ibid., p.311-312), remarkably, not even in the broader civilian power interpretation (Ibid., p.314-315). Washington has always preferred to interact with EU member states directly, rather than to discuss security issues on an EU level. On the one hand, this is because the US doesn’t recognize a true decisive leadership in the High Representative, and on the other hand, the US can also apply more pressure on or find more like-minded actors in certain member states, who in their turn represent a strong ‘Atlantic factor’ within ESDP. This has led to the existence of ‘Europeanists’ (like France, Luxemburg and Belgium) and ‘Atlanticists’ (the UK, Poland, Czech Republic), or what former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounced as ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe after the Iraq debacle in 2003 (Ibid.,
Policy-makers in Japan and the EU

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In short, there is a lot of internal discussion about the role of the US in Europe’s security operations (Ibid., p.310-312). Partly generated by Washington, the discussion proves to be an obstacle for an ambitious and autonomous European security framework. Especially the Iraq War of 2003 displayed this internal security rift in the EU, where some countries like the UK and Poland agreed to support the unilateral invasion by the Bush administration, while other countries like France, Germany and Belgium were appalled by the negligence of international rules. But ultimately, a clearer divergence between Brussels and Washington with regards to the international system could be observed. This divergence has been growing since the end of the Cold War but really culminated with the Iraq War of 2003. It comes down to the fact that - depending on the administration - the US generally has been wary of international rules and frameworks which might jeopardize its autonomy in security, whereas the EU has promoted an international order based on rules on a consistent basis (Ibid., p.314). Doing so, the EU has positioned itself as a civilian power, engaging broader security areas through international frameworks. In any case, it is clear that the EU tries to conduct a foreign security policy autonomous from the US, but paradoxically it still is partly dependant on the US, since the EU does not posses enough structural and logistical resources to carry out true autonomous operations on par with the US.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, various important actors and interests to Japanese and EU security policy were discussed. The aim was to analyze norms, structures and actors in order to understand their civilian power nature. Norms of anti-militarism (Article 9) and internationalism and the end of the Cold War inspired Japanese decision-makers with alternative ways to adhere to the principle of pacifism and take up a more representative international role in security nonetheless. We also saw that among the various dominant actors in Japanese security policy, the Prime Minister, MOD and MOFA were accumulating more influence in devising a clear security policy. Contrary to neo-realists views, however, all of this didn’t lead to a strictly independent security policy. Under Koizumi, Japan in fact bolstered bilateralism with the US, but by providing supplemental strategies in more comprehensive security fields like human security and thus not by pursuing conventional power (Hook, 2005, p.175).

The EU was also extensively discussed. With the signing of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the EU also committed itself to contributing to the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights (Forster, 1999, p.750). In order to adhere to this commitment,
the EU was given specific instruments within the CFSP. This pillar and ESDP received considerable analysis, since it is here that the EU’s foreign and security policy is developed. The main actors are the European Council and the High Representative of the CFSP, although it should be noted the European Commission occasionally plays a minor ‘stealth’ role through financial, economic and development assistance (one of its competences granted by the first pillar) (Keukeleire, 2008, p.86-93). In addition, the role of the United States was discussed, since it would be blatantly naïve to believe that the US has absolutely no influence on EU security. US presence in Europe through NATO, its worldwide structural power and the presence of ‘Atlanticists’ within the EU mean that - just like Japan- the EU is dependant on Washington’s foreign security policy as well. However, because of an ‘Europeanist’ tendency in some countries and deepening European integration in security fields, dependency on the US is not being replaced per se, but instead new complementary activities are being developed in broader security fields.

On the one hand, Japanese pacifism, financial contributions, a civilian security command structure, and on the other hand, the EU pillar-structure, the nature of ESDP and the actors involved there, have respectively led to Japanese and EU foreign policies representative of civilian power. This civilian power is exerted in areas like peacekeeping, peace-building, natural disaster management, promotion of international law, climate change, through international fora like the UN. In the next chapter we will examine how Japan and the EU display this civilian power in Southeast Asia and how this might lead to increased cooperation in security.
Chapter III

Prospects for Japan-EU cooperation in Southeast Asia?

The war in Iraq made clear that in order for Japan and the EU to cooperate in the same area on the same security issues, the US is an undeniable factor. However, in Southeast Asia we do see emerging cooperation between Japan and the EU, without involvement of the US. In contrast to Northeast Asia, where the US is a dominant regional actor, Washington doesn’t exert a lot of influence in Southeast Asia. Instead of the US, it is ASEAN\(^{30}\), the UN and various international actors like China, Japan and the EU which enjoy legitimacy power or in other words “the justifiable right to make a request or to persuade” (Kwei-Bo Huang, 2008, p.274). This is due to US negligence over the course of many years and its reluctance to engage in peacekeeping missions in the area. This had left a vacuum for powers like the EU, China and Japan to develop platforms in order to deal with human security areas like the prevention of ethnic conflicts and other roots of violence in Southeast Asia (Ibid., p.275-276).

3.1 Japan’s civilian power in Southeast Asia

There are two main reasons for Japan to have an interest in the region. One is the economic hinterland nature of Southeast Asia. In recent years, Chinese and European activity in the region has increased and sea lanes important to Japanese export and import are being threatened by the presence of pirates who target Japanese shipping companies. (Smith, 2006, p.179-198, also see Khai Leong, 2005, p.154). Another reason is that non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia could have severe spillover effects in the greater East Asian region. Avian influenza virus (H5N1) which is endemic to large bird populations in Southeast Asia (Nature), terrorism and cyber crime are just mere examples of such spillover effects (Khai Leong, 2005, p.155-156). Therefore, it is imperative to a modern country like Japan to engage Southeast Asia on these issues.

However, there is also a third reason for Japan to participate in Southeast Asian security affairs. In contrast to Northeast Asia, Japanese involvement with security issues- and particularly the deployment of SDF overseas- has been welcomed by nations of Southeast Asia, where surviving historical sentiments are not as fierce (Smith, 2006, p.186). This

\(^{30}\) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of the following ten member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (also see the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [http://www.aseansec.org/] (Last retrieved on 15-04-2009)
provides Japan with a region where it can deploy a proactive foreign policy without having to deal with suspicious minds. Moreover, Japan might be the only Asian country which has enough financial reserve to actually support a proactive security commitment in Southeast Asia (Ueki, 1993, p.363). Apart from financial means, Japan’s security commitment also materializes in SDF participation in UN peacekeeping missions, anti-piracy measures, counterterrorism and support for human rights (Smith, 2006, p.185-195). Such SDF involvement would be unthinkable in Northeast Asia.

Cambodia serves as a good example of Japanese proactive foreign policy in Southeast Asia. In the early 90s, Japan organized several conferences on Cambodia, where there had been a Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict since 1978\(^{31}\). Japan succeeded in drawing a peace agreement between the warring parties and made a large financial contribution to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In addition, the Japanese collected $880 million in reconstruction efforts, almost a quarter of which was directly financed by the Japanese themselves. Finally, the Diet also passed a bill allowing the despatch of SDF in a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO) in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993 (Hook, 2005, p.223, also see Pan, 2006, p.125-129; Ueki, 1993, p.363-365). Apart from Japan, a great number of European nations like France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany also contributed to this UNPKO, working together in fields like human rights, organising elections, military arrangements, maintaining law and order and resettlement of displaced persons (see UNTAC). Such proactive foreign policy by MOFA’s Bureau for Asian Affairs and Bureau for United Nations Affairs, the Japanese Cabinet, JDA (now MoD), and the Diet was well received in Southeast Asia (Ueki, 1993, p.363-365). In the following years, Japan would participate with other European nations in more UNPKO such as in East Timor in 1999 (INTERFET) and presently in UNMIT in East Timor (see MOFA UNMIT pdf) and UNMIN in Nepal (see MOFA UNMIN).

Not to bore the reader with many abbreviations of UN sanctioned missions, it is also feasible to mention that Japan has contributed to anti-piracy measures in Southeast Asia, particularly with regards to the safety of vital passageways for Japanese commercial shipping in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait. Apart from organizing various conferences on Southeast Asian piracy, Japan has also committed financial assistance and even trained Southeast Asian coast guards through its own Japan Coast Guard (Hook, 2005, p.187).

\(^{31}\) The conflict originated in 1978 when the communist Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia, slaughtering numerous people. Vietnam intervened and installed a puppet government. For a more detailed description, see Pan, 2006, p.125-129.
With regards to counterterrorism, Japan hosts several training seminars to Southeast Asian officials to combat terrorist and separatist movements in their countries (see MOFA counterterrorism assistance). Moreover, Japan has also pledged Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia (see MOFA terrorism ODA), e.g. the “Grant Assistance For Grassroots Human Security Projects” in the Mindanao region in the southern Philippines (Smith, 2006, p.187-188; also see MOFA Mindanao).

Finally, Japan has also addressed human rights in Southeast Asia, but in a more constructivist ‘Asian’ approach. The emergence of ‘Asianism’ – the notion that human rights are perceived differently in Asia, compared to the Western world- among policy-makers in Japan and Asia on the whole, meant a step away from Western positions on Southeast Asia. Japan acknowledged the state of Myanmar (Burma) and prudently engaged the repressive, militarist regime and supporters of pro-democracy activist and captive Aung San Suu Kyi[32] to re-enter into dialogue (Smith, 2006, p.189). In line with the workings of ASEAN and Asianism, Japan holds to the principle of non-interference in domestic politics when it comes to human rights, a vision not shared by its EU partners (Hook, 2005, p.198-190).

### 3.2 The EU’s civilian power in Southeast Asia

EU interest in Southeast Asia is hardly surprising as well. The reason is that Southeast Asia, with its regional integration of ASEAN, is gradually attaining a high economic profile in today’s globalized world and thus interdependency between the EU and ASEAN is increasing. Therefore, the EU has a strong interest in the political, economic and security aspects of ASEAN (EU #4; EU #5). The 2005 civilian operation in Aceh in Indonesia serves as a good example of the EU’s security commitment in Southeast Asia (Keukeleire, 2008, p.185-191). The operation is representative of the last three objectives of the EU’s CFSP[33]. Also called the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), almost 300 civilian monitors from the EU, Switzerland, Norway and ASEAN[34] were dispatched after a peace agreement was reached between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, an agreement triggered by the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This multinational participation led by the EU, is in line with the

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[32] Elected as Prime Minister of Burma in 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi’s victory was nullified by the military junta. Immediately after, she was placed under house arrest, where she remains to this day (Asahi Shimbun 「スー・チーさんを訴追 有罪判決確定か」 14-05-2009 Last retrieved on 17-05-2009).

[33] See chapter II.

[34] Participating ASEAN countries were Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Singapore.
CFSP objective of international cooperation. AMM’s main goal was to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement as it was set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (see Aceh Monitoring Mission; also see Keukeleire, 2008, p.187-191). This included monitoring various aspects like disarmament, human rights (freedom of speech and cetera), legislative change (broader autonomy for the Aceh region) and reintegration of GAM members (see Aceh Monitoring Mission). The monitoring of these aspects is in line with the last CFSP objective and the elaboration of EU mission tasks as formulated by ESDP.

As mentioned above, EU member states also participated in UN sanctioned missions in Cambodia (UNTAC in 1993) (UN #1), but also in East Timor (UNMIT in 1999, UNTAET 1999-2002 and UNMISET 2002-2005) (UN #2). However, these missions were outside of the scope of ESDP and thus should not be seen as an EU initiative. Nonetheless, time and time again, the actions of large countries within the EU (France, Germany, the UK) have proved to be important incentives for EU policy.

As explained in the previous chapter, Japan also participated in many of these UN missions. Moreover, joint peacekeeping has become a major field of cooperation in both the EU and Japan’s security engagements. To sustain this increasing government-led dialogue, meetings are regularly organized which bring both governmental actors as non-governmental organisations (NGO) to the table (Hook, 2005, p.333). Additional fields of cooperation in Southeast Asia can be identified in natural disaster management (e.g. after Cyclone Nargis in 2008) (Bangkok Post, March 5, 2009) and the promotion of human rights through the annual Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Forster, 1999, p.755).

This Japan-EU cooperation on human rights proved to be a necessity, because of the EU’s initial failure to promote ‘European values’ in Southeast Asia. Moreover, in 1997 the EU imposed economic sanctions on ASEAN, because many EU member states condemned practices like forced labour in militarist countries like Myanmar which had become an ASEAN member. It was clear there was a divergent view and approach to human rights, with ASEAN rejecting ‘European values’ in favour of ‘Asian values’ (Ibid., p.751) or ‘Asiainism’. It was only with Lee Kuan Yew’s proposal of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (アジア欧州会合 Ajiaōshūkaigō) that the EU was again able to discuss human rights with ASEAN countries. Because countries like China and Japan were also sitting at the table of ASEM, they could play a mediating role for talks between the EU and ASEAN on human rights. This way EU concerns were heard without ‘mingling’ too much in ASEAN affairs, but the EU was

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35 Former Prime Minister of Singapore (1959-1990)
also reminded at the same time by Chinese and Japanese policy-makers that European values and eurocentrism don’t necessarily work in Southeast Asia (Vanoverbeke, 2007, p.96-116). Thanks to its informal and multilateral nature, ASEM proves to be an excellent vehicle for Japan and the EU to work together in Southeast Asia. ASEM meetings have addressed security issues such as arms control, non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and disarmament issues (Forster, 1999, p.755).

3.3 Conclusion

This cooperation through international structures like informal ASEM meetings and participation in UNPKO in Southeast Asia, highlights the civilian power of Japan and the EU and how they wish to play a part in security matters in the area. With regards to Japan, Cambodia was given as an example of how proactive Japanese foreign security policy can really be. We have seen how different domestic actors in Japan undertook a proactive foreign policy by taking part in UN activities and that many Western European countries followed suit. With regards to the EU, we have seen that although ESDP is very recent, there has already been a substantial EU contribution to Southeast Asia with the civilian operation in Aceh. However, over the course of several years, the EU has had a hard time to find common ground with ASEAN regarding human rights. It was only with the presence of countries like Japan at the informal table of ASEM, that the EU was finally able to express concerns without having to fear dismissal by ASEAN countries. This proves that there are some promising opportunities for the EU and Japan to cooperate in security matters, especially in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion

Challenges and opportunities

In this paper we have discussed the long road to political dialogue between Japan and the European Union during the Cold War and how this came to be institutionalized with the Hague Declaration of 1991. As civilian powers, Japan and the EEC recognized each other’s potential for dialogue on non-military issues and left traditional security matters within the scope of respective Japan-US and EU-US reciprocity.

With the Action Plan of 2001 various non-military security fields were identified for increased cooperation, such as environmental degradation, human rights and the spread of WMD’s. As we have seen, Southeast Asia provides a unique opportunity for Japan and the EU to exert this cooperation. But issues of human security are not exclusively addressed vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, but on a global scale as well. Past examples are regular joint meetings to discuss the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights, joint promotion of the Kyoto Protocol and a joint effort to establish the International Criminal Court (Hook, 2005, p.334). It is clear that the UN proves an ideal platform for the EU and Japan to make joint non-military contributions in security areas like conflict prevention and management (Ibid., p.340), and Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming an important catalyst for such security cooperation.

Though, in order for Japan and the EU to make such contributions, some internal challenges have to be overcome. The Japanese still carry (and are constantly reminded of) a war-past which, along with no clear decisive leadership, makes any attempt for a more independent security policy highly controversial, while the EU still has to unify divergent positions on security and improve its legitimacy and decision-structure as an entity. If both Japan and the EU wish to exert a proactive foreign policy, first they need to address these internal challenges, secondly, they need to recognize that there are interesting prospects for security cooperation already in place, and thirdly, they need to utilise these promising prospects by effectively coordinating cooperation and thus not wait for the US or UN to create ad hoc encounters. If not, Japan-EU reciprocity on security will remain sidelined to the sister dialogues with the US for some time to come. With threats to human security taking more prominence and unilateral activity by the United States on the increase, the civilian powers of Japan and the EU carry a huge responsibility as leading economic and diplomatic actors to provide a counterbalance on the international stage. Therefore, not only Japan and the EU have to gain with improved reciprocity, but the world as a whole.
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### タイトル
日欧シビリアン・パワー、安全保障協力の展望と東南アジア

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### 背景・目的
日欧政治関係は冷戦時代から複雑に進展されました。その間、日本と欧州連合は本当の「シビリアン・パワー」になったことから、2001年に「日・EU協力のための行動計画」を採択した。人間の安全保障を含む広い分野での対話を進展させ、協力関係を構築された。「日欧協力の10年」が公表された。しかし、2009年に具体的な結果が見られません。日米安全保障関係と欧米安全保障関係と比較すると、日欧安全保障関係は相対的にむしろ弱点と言えよう。2001年～2010年は「日欧協力の10年」を公表したにしては、日欧安全保障関係が強化されていない。

そこで、この論文では、日欧関係の歴史も「シビリアン・パワー」も政策の立役者も東南アジアのチャンスについて観察と調査を行った。

### 研究方法
まず、現代の日欧関係が分かるために、冷静時代からの複雑な進展を論じた。この歴史には冷戦の影響はむしろ高かったので、概説が「冷戦の初め」と「デタント時代」と「新冷戦」と「冷戦の終わり」に分けられた。

次に、「シビリアン・パワー」という概念を説明し、日本と欧州連合の安全保障政策を比較した。特に、の国家と首相、官僚のような立役者を調べた。欧州連合に対して、「共通外交安全保障政策」と「安全保障・防衛政策」、欧州理事会、共通外交・安全保障政策上級代表を調べた。なお、両方場合は米国の影響も論じた。

それから、どうやって東南アジアが日欧協力の触発になるか説明してみた。

### 結果
日本の場合は、日欧関係を強化するために、憲法の第9課、国家と首相と官僚の特色が邪魔になるだろう。欧州連合の場合は、EUの機能と意志決定過程と安全保障の動きについての立場がまだ分岐されている。

この研究によって、日本と欧州連合が協力を強化すべきだろう。安全保障の関心を守るためのパートナーシップはともかく、米国の一国主義に歯止めをかけるように世界も改良した日欧協力がいると考える。